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- 
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The Assembly,
(i) Considering that the purpose of the modified Brussels Treaty is to ensure the defence of member
countries, promote European unity and sfrengthen both collective security in Europe and world peace;
(ii) Noting that WEU member countries are resolved to continue to exercise their sovereignty over all
matters relating to the composition of their armed forces and their possible deployment;
(iii) Convinced that the Atlantic Alliance will for a long time be the cornerstone of Europe's security and
defence, but that it can only play a proper role if its restructuring process also allows for a genuine rein-
forcement of is European pillar;
(iv) Considering that for more than forty years the United States leadership of the Atlantic Alliance was
based on the conviction that its security was at stake in Europe;
(v) Noting, however, that in Europe's new security environment with a united Germany in NATO and
the threat of a surprise attack from the East having disappeared, there is no longer an absolute guarantee
that the United States will intervene in regional crisis situations;
(vi) Aware that United States interventions in crisis situations on the European continent will depend as
much on the defence of its national interests as on its international obligations;
(vii) Considering that, as a consequence, future peacekeeping operations may need to be carried out by
the European allies rather than by the United States;
(viii) Convinced that NATO's internal resffucturing should be fully accomplished in order to ensure
strong cohesion among its present sixteen member states before engaging in any enlargement;
(i.x) Noting that, at present, it would seem equally appropriate both to extend defence guarantees to the
borders of the CIS and to deepen relations with Russia in the interest of Europe's security, it being under-
stood that any enlargement of NAIO must serve to enhance that security;
(x) Strongly regretting that despite its efforts for four years to establish and conduct a common foreign
and security policy, Europe has not been able to bring about peace in former Yugoslavia without military
and diplomatic intervention and military support from the United States;
(xi) Stressing that, despite the important progrcss which has been made in recent years in fransforming
WEU into an operational organisation capable of undertaking an effective military operation, there are still
too many deficiencies which need to be addressed urgently in order to attain the following objectives:
- 
a European military headquarters including a fully-developed command, control and communi-
cations system;
- 
a fully-developed planning capacity;
- 
European mobile armed forces available at short notice;
- 
standardisation and interoperability of equipment;
- 
independent European intelligence and reconnaissance;
(xii) Regretting that more than two years after the adoption of the CJTF concept, NAIO has not yet been
able to give practical effect to what is considered to be a vital means of improving WEU's operational
capability;
(riil Considering that it is inopportune to integrate WEU in the European Union until it has fully deve-
loped the capabilities required to elaborate and implement the decisions and actions of the Union which
have defence implications;
(xiv) Stessing that WEU's activities cannot be confined to Petersberg tasks, ignoring the core function
of collective defence as defined in Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty;
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(n) Stressing that the intergovernmental conference cannot ignore the question of Europe's own collec-
tive defence capability in view of the possibility of a more limited interpretation by the United States of
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty;
(xvi) Considering that, in order to prevent the anomalous existence of different zones of security and
defence within the European Union, any future enlargement of the Union should take account of the fact
that the countries concerned will, in due course, have to become members of NAIO and WEU;
(ryii) Considering that a tnrly European collective defence should include comprehensive protection from
the North Cape to the Caucasus and require the full participation of the associate members of WEU;
(niii)Aware that, at present, insufficient cooperation arnong WEU member countries and reductions in
their budgets stand in the way of any serious ambition to establish a European collective defence in any
field other than crisis management;
(xix) Noting that Europe faces the almost impossible task of developing a defence policy adapted on the
one hand to existing and future threas and risks and on the other to its fairly resfiicted capabilities;
(xr) Considering that there is an urgent requirement for a restructuring of the existing European
defence industry to enable it to cope with increased competition worldwide;
(xxil Stressing that the member states of WEU should no longer hesitate to create the long-awaited Euro-
pean Armaments Agency;
(tcxii) Considering the need for a debate on the role of nuclear weapons in view of the extension of the
NPT, the planned comprehensive test ban reaty and the French proposal for " concerted deterrence ",
RrcorwrmNps rruff rrm CouNcu-
1. Maintain the modified Brussels Treary in force, contemplate no revision thereof other than by the
signatory states and not allow accession to WEU by any country not prepared to participate fully in a com-
mon defence within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance and at the same time in the activities of the
CFSP;
2. Reject any proposal to separate WEU from the European Union, and give proper effect to the deci-
sion taken at Maastricht to place WEU at the service of the European Union should military action be
envisaged under the CFSP, at the same time ensuring that the WEU Council makes full use of its ability to
take any decisions arising out of the application of the moffied Brussels Treaty, which will always be in
the interest of the European Union and other organisations such as the United Nations and the OSCE;
3. Request the European Union to admit only those countries that are prepared to participate in a Euro-
pean defence;
4. Propose that WEU should not be integrated in the European Union until all the members of the
European Union have accepted Article V of the modified Brussels Treatyi
5. Resume and broaden in strategic terms preparatory work on a white paper on European security and
defence which, among other things, should discuss the means required for combined interventions, with
or without the Americans, depending on whether they would wish to act or would prefer not to be invol-
ved in a crisis;
6. Concenfrate is energy on a reinforcement of WEU's operational capabilities in the framework of
srengthening the European pillar of a restructured NATO by:
(a) consolidating the links between WEU and NATO with a view to sharing the intelligence requi-
red for operational planning and activities of European armed forces;
(b) establishing a European headquarters in WEU which should, in order to prevent duplication, be
attached to the renovated structure of NATO;
(c) establishing a full and permanent European command and confrol capability for military oper-
ations, filling the existing gaps in the command chain between the WEU Council and the forces
answerable to WEU;
(d) establishing an operational structure combining all Ewopean multinational units, in particular
the European Corps, EUROFOR, EUROMARFOR, the Anglo-French air group, the Anglo-
Dutch amphibious force, and others into one effective and coherent force, ready to perform a
large-scale military operation at short notice;
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(e) doing everything possible to make NAf,O implement the CJTF concept by summer 1996 so
as to enable Europeans to make possible use of certain NATO operational assets where the
United States decided not to participate in specific security operations;
(f) reinforcing the Planning Cell and its intelligence section, duly enlarging is staffand providing
it with the appropriate equipment and technical resources to enable it to perform all its tasks at
a fully-operational level, including in times of crisis;
(g) establishing a direct link between the WEU Planning Cell and the WEU Satellite Centre in Tor-
rej6n, through which the Planning Cell should have direct access to the satellite imagery avail-
able at the Centre, including the possibility of questioning the Centre on imagery-related
issues;
(h) rcnegonating the existing Memorandum of Understanding regarding Helios 1A with a view to
giving the WEU Satellite Centre the possibility of programming part of the activities of the
Helios 1B successor satellite which is to be launched in the 1997-98 timeframe;
7. Make every effort to maintain the scientific, technological and defence industrial base which is vital
for the defence of Europe primarily by:
(a) supporting an amendment of the text of Article 223 of the Treaty on European Union in order
to ensure that decisions concerning the defence industry are no longer exclusively a matter of
national sovereignty;
(b) creattng a European Armaments Agency as a subsidiary body of WEU which should be res-
ponsible for managing bilateral and multilateral weapons prograrnmes, streamlining procure-
ment procedures and coordinating research and development spending;
(c) promoting, pending the creation of a European Armaments Agency, any agrcements reached
between European defence industries on bilateral or multilateral weapons prograrnmes;
(d,) promoting, in weapons programmes, intelligent arns systems of the third millennium rather
than prograrnmes which were undertaken during the cold war and which no longer appear to
serve a useful pupose;
8. Engage in a debate on a European defence possibly consolidated by concerted deterrence.
DocuItEI{T 1510
Exphnatory Memorandam
(submifred by Mr Baamd, Cluiruan and Rapporteur)
I.Introduction
1. The Maasfricht summit of December l99l
was marked by the intention to make a quantum
leap in the European integration process. Even if
many of the participants had different views of the
speed and depth of integration, none of them
wished to be publicly denounced as a wet blanket
or for calling into question the long and meticu-
lous preparatory work which had involved so
many wise men and specialists.
2. Bold decisions were made, one of them
being the establishment of a common foreign and
security policy under the provisions of Title Y
Article J. Article J.4 provided for the defence
implications and in particular it was stated that:
" 1. The common foreign and security
policy shall include all questions
related to the security of the Union,
including the eventual framing of a
common defence policy, which might
in time lead to a common defence.
2. The Union requests the Western Euro-
pean Union (WEU), which is an inte-
gral part of the development of the
Union, to elaborate and implement
decisions and actions of the Union
which have defence implications. The
Council shall, in agreement with the
institutions of the WEU, adopt the
necessary practical alrangements. "
3. On the other hand, there was an apparent
reluctance to limit the sovereign rights of member
states in security and defence policy or to call into
question the value of the existing North Atlantic
Treaty, as stated in Article J.4.4:
" 4. The policy of the Union in accordance
with this Article shall not prejudice the
specific character of the security and
defence policy of certain Member
States and shall respect the obligations
of certain Member States under the
North Atlantic Treaty and be compa-
tible with the common security and
defence policy established within that
framework. "
4. Article J.4.6 states that " With a view to
furthering the objective of this Treaty'o ... 'o the
provisions of this article may be revised ... on the
basis of a report to be presented in 1996 by the
Council to the European Council, which shall
include an evaluation of the progress made and
the experience gained until then. "
5. Much has already been said in the discus-
sions preparing the 1996 intergovernmental
conference (IGC) which will examine those pro-
visions of the Treaty on European Union for
which revision is provided. Too much or still not
enough? The member states of the European
Union and WEU, which will be the protagonists
in the IGC, have expressed their views, some
more clearly than others, and it may well be that a
number of them have not yet revealed all their
cards. The course to be taken has not yet been
chosen and there is still a wide range of options
available.
6. The Council's report mentioned in Article
J.4.6 has not yet been published, but recently, at
its Madrid meeting of 14 November 1995, the
WEU Council of Ministers published its own
contribution to the work of the 1996 conference
regarding aspects that affect WEU. The Council
said that this document was established " on the
basis of its own review of the provisions of the
Declaration on the role of WEU and its relations
with the European Union and with the Atlantic
Alliance of December l99I ".
7. Taking into account the Council's contibu-
tion to the 1996 conference, the WEU Assembly's
Defence Committee has now taken the opport-
unity to present its own views on the defenie of
Europe with regard to this conference. Quite natu-
rally, this report will concentrate mainly on the
defence aspects, leaving the institutional aspects
to be discussed by the Political Committee.
IL The rob of Rassia
8. Discussing the defence of Europe is impos-
sible without questioning the role of Russia. Will
Russia become a reliable partner or will it remain
an unstable political atrd socio-economic entity
which could put peace and security in Europe at
risk? The final answer to this question cannot be
given yet and it will take many years for the dust
to settle on the present chaotic upheaval in Russia.
In the meantime, we will have to live with many
uncertainties and remain flexible enough to be
able to react to unpredictable events in every way
possible.
9. There can be no doubt that the strategic
situation has changed dramatically since the unifi-
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cation of Germany and the collapse of the former
Soviet Union. As far as security in Europe is
concerned, present-day Russia is different from
the former Soviet Union for several reasons.
10. First of all, it is to be noted that Russia's
armed forces have been withdrawn from the terri-
tory of Moscow's former Warsaw Pact allies.
What is left of the armed forces under Russian
control is in an advanced state of dilapidation. For
a number of years, there has been a chronic lack
of funding. In 1995, the Russian armed forces
received only 60Vo of the approved budget. For
1996, the armed forces have been promised 82
trillion roubles, which falls far short of the 113
trillion roubles requested by the Defence Minister.
Soldiers are demoralised, poorly paid and poorly
frained. It is said that Russian pilots only receive
20 to 30 hours of flight training per year, compa-
red to ttre 150 to 220 fltdht hours in the air forces
of NAIO member statesr. Equipment is often in a
bad state of maintenance or outdated and fuel and
power supplies are a serious problem.
11. OnIy the nuclear forces with an arsenal of
about2T 000 warheads are being well-maintained
and, logically, this could be a matter of concern if
there was no strong political leadership to confrol
the military.
12. Although Russia is not fully implementing
the CFE Treaty on the reduction of conventional
forces in Europe, it should be noted that Russia's
share in the global arms balance in Europe is only
about l57o of the stock held previously by the
Soviet Union.
13. Events in Chechnya, where the Russian
armed forces, while far superior in numbers and
equipment, took months to control Grozny and
almost completely devastated the city, have
shown serious deficiencies in the arrned forces'
capability to mount armed operations. Recently,
the destruction of the village of Pervomayskoye,
where about 200 terrorists had entrenched them-
selves with their hostages, has merely confirmed
that the Russian anny now lacks the will and skill
to engage in surgical strikes.
14. It has recently become known that Russia
has refused to implement the " Joint Statement on
the Transparency and Irreversibility of the Pro-
cess of Reducing Nuclear Weapons " which was
drawn up by President Bill Clinton and President
Boris YelSin at their May 1995 summit meeting.
Implementation talks have in practice been sus-
pended and, as a consequence, the mutual inspec-
tions and data exchanges concerning weapons and
nuclear materials are not taking place. Nor is Rus-
sia implementing a 1994 agr*ment which stipu-
lated that it was to cease producing plutonium, a
key building-block of nuclear weapons. There are
also doubts over implementation by Russia of a
1992 deal between the United States and Russia,
according to which the United States would pay
Russia $12 billion for 500 metric tonnes of highly
enriched uranium from scrapped nuclear arms.
The first major shipments of enriched uranium
began arriving in June 1995, but the United States
Government has no appropriate inspection righs
to verify its source of origin. United States
govemment officials suggested that the change in
Russia's attitude could jeopardise the process of
ratification of the START tr Treaty by the Ameri-
can Congress, but on 26lanuary 1996 the United
States Senate in fact ratified this treaty.
15. Support for START tr has been expressed
by the Russian Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Prima-
kov, and President Boris Yeltsin. Raffication by
the Russian Duma is, however, still highly uncer-
tain since many of its members feel that the freaty
favours the United States. The communist leader
Gennadi Zyuganov has stated that NAIO's plans
to expand eastwards called into question ratifica-
tion of START II, sftessing ttrat NAIO's enlarge-
ment o' upsets the balance of conventional forces,
destroys the achieved agreements and raises the
issue of how to compensate for this ",. The leader
of the extreme nationalists, Vladimir Zririnovsky,
who said that Russia should not rush into ratifica-
tion, ventured that the treaty " makes Russia a
secondary power ".
16. According to START II, Russia has to
destroy its highly accurate SS-18 land-based mis-
siles, while it does not have sufficient submarine-
based missiles to reach its permitted ceiling.
17. Russians are also uneasy about possible
United States proposals to change the Anti-Ballis-
tic Missile (ABM) Treaty in order to be able to
deploy a national missile defence system. It is
said that at a forthcoming United States-Russian
summit meeting, the United States may make pro-
posals to reassure Russia on the ABM Treaty,
while at the same time proposing a START III
agreement with a limit of 2 000 warheads which
would put Russia in a less unfavourable position.
18. Russia's resistance to any eastward enlarge-
ment of NATO is only too well known. The recent
changes in the composition of the Russian
Government have by no means made it more
forthcoming on thii issue. Although nobody
would admit a Russian veto on NATO enlarge-
ment, its opinion cannot be ignored since relations
with Russia are vitally important for security in
Europe.
19. The Russian economy is in a state of total
collapse and although it will probably start to
grow in l996,it will have a long way to go before
it recovers the losses of recent years. Russiaos
l. DefenseNews, 15-21 January 1996. 2. International Herald Tribune, 30 January 1996.
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trade balance is healthy because oil and gas still
represent 417o of exports while, on the other hand,
only little of the capital equipment which is need-
ed for a substantial recovery is being imported. It
should be noted, however, that oil production is
decreasing with far too few investments in that
sector being made to reverse the downward trend.
20. In politics, there is an unmistakable retreat
fromreform and nostalgia for old habits is making
a comeback.
21. The December 1995 elections for the State
Duma resulted in more seats for the communists,
who are now by far the largest political group with
158 seats (22.3Vo). On the other hand, as was
rightly observed in a report of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe 3, the com-
bined percentage national vote for communists
and ultra-nationalists is virtually unchanged. At
the same time, the combined percentage national
vote for " centrists " and reformers more or less
matches the vote for the communists. Altogether,
one could conclude that there is a degree of stabi-
lisation on the political landscape, although the
general political situation seems to be fragile.
22. Still, it should be noted that Russia's lea-
dership is retreating from the economic reform
which is badly needed to put the counbry back on
the rails. Also, in foreign policy, the forthcoming
and conciliatory attitude adopted by President
Gorbachev is gradually being replaced by a more
assertive stance.
23. Preparing his campaign to be re-elected as
President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin fired Foreign
Minister Andrei Kozyrev, who was increasingly
criticised by communists and nationalists for his
pro-Western views. Yevgeni Primakov, the newly
appointed Foreign Minister, and former KGB
head offoreign intelligence, is regarded as a prag-
matist who is neither friendly nor hostile to the
West. Mr Primakov has stressed, however, that
Russia will behave as a o'great power " and has
pledged a more aggressive pursuit of Russian
interests, especially in regard to the West a. On
16 January 1996, President Yeltsin accepted the
resignation of Anatoli Chubais, the deputy Prime
Minister, who supervised the stabilisation of the
Russian economy and designed its privatisation
programme. Mr Chubais was the last liberal left in
an increasingly hard-line cabinet. His successor,
Vladimir Kadamikov, has frequently called in
public for more state support for industry, higher
tariffs to protect domestic producers and a halt to
the strong rouble policy which has hit exporters.
His appointment could signify more interven-
tionist economic policies and a return to hyper-
inflation.
Document 7430, Addendum V.
lnternational Herald Tribune ,22 Jaruuy 1996.
24. A few days later, on 24 January, Sergei
Kovalev, the well-known Chairman of the
Russian Human Rights Commission and a mem-
ber of President Yeltsin's Advisory Council,
announced his resignation from both organs,
lamenting that the President had failed both to
come to grips with organised crime and to initiate
a reform of the army, while increasingly resorting
to secrecy and lies.
25. While the war against separatist Chechnya
has been dragging on now for more than a year,
the tendency of Russia's leadership to resort to
violence has become a pattern.
26. The Russian leadership is apparently un-
aware that it will never succeed in eradicating
nationalism in the Caucasus which it subjected to
a long and bloody campaign before incorporating
it into the Russian empire in the 19th century.
Chechen and other Caucasian nationalists will
increasingly pose a serious threat to the existing
balance in Russian govemment and society. The
violent methods which are now being employed
to exterminate " bandits " and " terrorists " may
very well be sowing the seeds for increased desta-
bilisation in Russian politics.
27. Oil, natural gas, the energy infrastructure
and pipelines are all important reasons for Russia
to keep the Caucasus undercontrol. One wonders,
however, whether the Russian leadership has ever
made a serious evaluation of the issues at stake or
weighed the political and military cost against
economic returns and calculated the chances of
keeping the area under stable political control.
III. Implementalion of the CFE Treary
28. The Treaty on the Reduction of Conven-
tional Forces in Europe (CFE), signed in Paris in
November 1990, called for fuIl implementation
by its signatories by the final deadline of 17
November 1995, with a review conference to take
place in Vienna in May 1996.
29. On many occasions, Russia has argued that
it has problems implementing the freaty because
the limits imposed on Treaty Limited Equipment(TLE) for its northern (St. Petersburg/I(o1a) and
southern (Tran s-Caucasu sA.{orthern C aucasu s )
flanks no longer corresponded fully to the new
realities. The limits gmnted to the Soviet Union
for its northern and southern flanks together
amounted to 1 300 combat tanks, I 380 armoured
cars and I 680 pieces of artillery.
30. Other signatories have insisted that the
CFE Treaty, which is generally considered as the
cornerstone of European security, must be preser-
ved and implemented as planned.
3.
4.
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3I. In September 1995, at the opening of the
two-month session in Vienna of the Joint Consul-
tative Group (JCG) planned for this treaty, NATO
proposed a compromise on the question of flanks,
offering to remove a few " oblasts " from them,
thus creating a rear zone and enabling both Russia
and Ukraine to maintain more equipment near
these flanls.In exchange, NAIO wished to intro-
duce a few more binding measiures, in particular
with regard to verification and information.
32. At the United States-Russian summit meet-
ing of 2L-22 October 1995, President Yeltsin
made a counter-proposal to President Clinton,
modifying CFE restrictions concerning the flanks,
but not providing any details. One week later, the
Russian Defence Minister, Pavel Grachev,
announced that he had reached an agreement with
the United States Defence Secretary, William
Perry, to exempt the Russians from implementing
the disarmament agreement in four regions in the
south of the country: Krasnodar, Stawopol, Vol-
gograd and Rostov on Don. He also stated that the
Russians had, for their part, agreed to include the
region of Lcningrad (St. Petersburg) in the nor-
thern flank. He went on to say that Moscow would
conserve a " margin of manoeuvre " to deploy
troops and armed vehicles on its northern flank,
thanks to its enclave in Kaliningrad. The other
signatories of the CFE Treaty, however, have not
yet agreed to any changes.
33. On the occasion of full entry into force
of the treaty on 17 November 1995, Minister
Grachev declared that Russia was " not ready to
actually respect " the treaty, adding that " seven or
eight other countries are also not ready " to apply
it fully'.
34. At the momento Russia and several other
ex-Soviet republics are still in breach of the CFE
Treaty and all attempts by the United States and
Russia to meddle with the terrns of the teaty have
raised sfiong objections, particularly from Tiirkey.
35. Some voices have now been heard to sug-
gest that Russia might be induced to soften its
objections to NAIO enlargement in return for
amendments to the CFE Treaty, but this would
really be a case ofputting the cart before the horse
and would not help to achieve the ultimate object-
ive of enhancing Europe's security.
M Earope, France and NATO
36. It is well known that France, in particular
since President Charles de Gaulle's decision in
l966to boycott NAfO's integrated military struc-
ture, has always taken a rather critical stance
towards NATO. Developments in Bosnia, how-
ever, have compelled France to reconsider its
position. The Dayton Peace Accords provided for
the establishment of an international implementa-
tion force (FOR), under the command of NATO,
to enforce the peace and replace the United
Nations force (UNPROFOR) whose mandate was
due to expire in early 1996. France, which had
decided to participate in IFOR, had no reasonable
choice other than to agree that French forces in
Bosnia would operate inside the NATO military
command system. On 5 December 1995, France
announced that it would participate fully in
NAf,O's military committee and meanwhile some
200 French officers have been assigned to NAIO
work.
37. Following these overtures, France announ-
ced on 17 January 1996 that it was prepared to
discuss nuclear issues within NAIO, while stres-
sing that it intended to maintain its full indepen-
dence as regards the developmen! production and
use of nuclear weapons. Since then, France has
again occupied its seat in meetings of NAIO's
defence ministers, but this does not mean that it
will participate fully in the integrated military
structure. At the same time, France has made it
clear that it will neither join NATO's Nuclear
Planning Group (MG) which oversees the plan-
ning, control and maintenance of the alliance's
nuclear arsenal, nor the Defence Planning Com-
mittee. Overall, France will take part in a1l discus-
sions on defence policy, strategy and questions of
general organisation, but not injoint planning or
the integrated military structure.
38. Does all this mean thatFrance has completely
given up the idea of a European defence organ-
isation? Not really. A Foreign Ministry spokes-
man has said that France wants to engage in a real
renovation of the Atlantic Alliance, including the
development of a true and equal European pillar,
but the issue is too complicated for a simple ieply.
In fact, there are many reasons for France's move.
3.9, In the first place, there is active French par-
ticipation in IFOR under NATO command. After
many years of active involvement in the United
Nations forces in Bosnia, France was not in a
position to give up its preponderant role. Logical-
ly, it was aiming to continue that role even with
ry4lq replacing the United Nations. JoiningNAIO's military command structure provided
France with a vote in the decision-makin! process
which also determines the fate of French nbops in
Bosnia.
40. Another practical consideration was that as
a result of thorough assessments of recent military
operations, the French armed forces, which are
among the very few capable of effective long-dis-
tance power projection, had concluded that they
needed more training and experience in the
command and control of large-scale integrated5. Atlantic News, 17 November 1995.
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battlefield operations. Participation in NAIO
operations and exercises could provide this
expenence.
41. On a totally different level, France may
have thought that NAIO could be the gateway to
a formidable future market for defence equipment
in the Central and Eastern European countries
which are all eager to acquire NAlO-compatible
equipment in the near or more distant future.
France's large but ailing defence indusnry badly
needs access to new markets.
42. The French proposal to participate in
NATO discussions on nuclear issues may help to
make clear to both its European and American
allies that France could provide the umbrella to
protect European allied territory should the Uni-
ted States nuclear umbrella cease to exist. One
important element of these discussions would be
the concept of " concerted deterrence ", which
France proposed to its European allies in Septem-
ber 1995, and which needs to be specified in
detail. Deterrence will remain valuable as long as
threats and risks continue to exist, but there can be
little doubt that existing doctrines of nuclear
deterrence will have to be adapted to changing
circumstances in post-cold war Europe.
43. France has understood that no progress can
be made in reinforcing the European Secwity and
Defence Identity (ESDI) as long as it does not
participate more actively in NAIO. In order to
placate Central and Eastern European states which
could not expect to join NATO overnight, NATO
has in recent years been subject to a number of
cosmetic operations and has created new institu-
tions such as the North Atlantic Cooperation
Council, almost forgotten after an initial vigorous
public relations offensive, and the Partrrership for
Peace, with an d la carte menu for such widely
divergent partners as Poland and Kirgizstan.
44. France is still deeply convinced that more
needs to be done to adapt NATO to the complete-
ly changed security and defence environment in
Europe. NATO needs to be restructured from
within and the unmistakably growing United
States isolationist tendency, despite many official
reassurances, combined with a considerably redu-
ced United States military presence in Europe,
call for a Europeanisation of NATO which should
also find its expression in NATO's command
structures. The European allies must be able to
deploy NATO assets for military operations in
Europe in which the United States does not want
to participate.
45. Part of this is the priority and still contro-
versial issue of the combined joint task force
concept which is still at a stalemate more than two
years after it was approved by the lanuary 1994
NATO summit meeting in Brussels. It is known
that France in particular 
- 
and rightly so 
- 
insists
on European control of the assets detached from
NATO's integrated command structure for
employment in European military operations
without United States participation, while the
United States insist that nominal, if not functional,
links to the (United States-dominated) command
structure are imperative.
46. Some time in the future, WEU will have to
be an integrated part of the European Union, but
for the foreseeable future, with the many different
statuses of its members and other participating
European states, prudence is in order. The after-
math of the conclusion of the Treaty on European
Union has shown that ill-advised steps can cause
serious disruption in the process of Europeos uni-
fication. France now seems to have rallied to the
prevailing view that WEU must first be developed
as the European pillar of NAIO before it can ever
become the defence arm of the European Union.
As an apparent consequence, integration of WEU
into the structures of the European Union can
therefore only be a distant and long-term political
objective.
V A Earopean defence poli.cy
47. On the eve of the IGC, the main question
for WEU is how Europe is going to organise its
security and defence. The main objective of the
security policy of present-day civilised states or
alliances is to prevent a situation in which their
arrned forces have to resort to the defence oftheir
tenitory. In crisis situations, every effort is made
to find solutions other than by military interven-
tion. It should also be noted that in the post-cold
war world, the fraditional task of territorial defence
has diminished in importance with the emphasis
shifting to crisis management, peacekeeping,
peacemaking and crisis intervention.
48. The risk and also the expense associated
with East/West confrontation in Europe have
disappeared and, as a consequence, so have the
former balance of power and strictly-disciplined
behaviour which were part of that situation.
Nowadays, the massive threat of inter-state wars
in Europe has largely disappeared, but it has been
replaced by the multi-headed Hydra of local and
regional conflicts and the risk of extremist ethnic,
religious and separatist movements. At the same
time, citizens feel threatened by phenomena
which are even more difficult to cope with, such
as criminality, terrorism, drugs, pollution and
mass migration. None of these new threats and
risks can be dealt with by individual states.
49. There can be little doubt that for the fore-
seeable future, NATO remains the vital corner-
stone of the defence of Europe's territory against
any existential threat because it is the only alliangs
with an integrated military structure and the main
DOCUIIEI\rI1510
source of common forces and other assets needed
for strategic operations.
50. On the other hand, Europe, as united in the
European Union, is irreversibly moving towards
further integration which also means an even
more inextricable entanglement of interests. A
logical and inevitable consequence of this integra-
tion process is the establishment of a common
foreign and security policy which makes little
sense unless it is supplemented by a proper defence
policy and a defence organisation to implement
that policy. Article J.4 of the Treaty on European
Union has indeed provided the basic framework.
No member state denies the need for interaction
and coordination between the CFSP and WEU, as
the defence arm of the European Union.
51. There also seems to be broad consensus
among European Union member states that in the
complementarity between NATO and the Euro-
pean Union/WEU, the former should retain the
vital task of Europe's collective defence, while
the latter should in principle limit its activities to
post-cold war crisis management as defined in the
Petersberg Declaration.
52. On every possible occasion, political
authorities declare that there cannot be any com-
petition between NATO and WEU, which are
both working and developing forthe benefit of the
security and defence of their member states. On
the other hand, it cannot be denied that a certain
intrinsic dynamism lies in establishing a Euro-
pean defence policy and revitalising the Atlantic
Alliance.
53. At its summit meeting in Brussels in Janu-
ary 1994, NATO endorsed the principle that col-
lective assets and capabilities of the Alliance can
be made available for WEU operations given that
WEU will not be able to perform successfully any
of the Petersberg tasks until it has developed its
operational capabilities. The purpose of the so-
called combined joint task force (CJTF) concepr
which was adopted at that time, is to provide sepa-
rable, but not separate, military capabilities that
could be employed by NATO or WEU, enabling
the European allies to conduct military operations
in the framework of WEU, if NAIO were unable,
or unwilling, to act. Since the beginning of 1994,
negotiations on the implementation of the CJTF
concept have been dragging on for more than two
years without any tangible result, although each
successive ministerial council meeting of both
NATO and WEU in the past two years has wel-
comed the progress made in negotiations on this
issue. Recently, NATO's Secretary General,
Javier Solana, admitted that the CJTF concept is
blocked and must receive a major boost during the
next six months.
54. The changing attitr.rde of the United States
in the Bosnian crisis has shown how unpredic-
table United States policy rowards security in
Europe can be. For a number of years, the United
States did not only not wish to intervene, but also
disagreed with its main European allies on the
analysis and consequences of the conflict in
Bosnia. The United States attitude in the conflict
took a very peculiar turn when, in September
1994, it gave up the arms embargo on Bosnia
while continuing to keep political and military
control over operation Sharp Guard in the
Adriatic.
55. The deployment of NATO assets by Euro-
peans is dfficult when the United States is indif-
ferent; one can therefore imagine how much more
difficult it would be in the case of a major Euro-
American disagreement.
56. In recent years the debate on the enlarge-
ment of western organisations, in particular
NAIO, the European Union and WEU, has inten-
sified. It has increasingly become clear that there
is a basic consensus on the inevitability of the
enlargement pr@ess, but far less so on the arrange-
ments and timeframes that should apply to the
candidates. In an ideal world, enlargement of the
three organisations should be simultaneous and
congruent. Reality is different because there are
too many different issues at stake.
57. Enlargement of the European Union to take
in the six Central European states 
- 
Bulgaria, the
Czech Repubtc, Hungary, Poland, Romania and
Slovakia 
- 
which have already signed " Europe
Agreements " formally designated as antecham-
bers to enEry, and the other four states which are
expected to sign in the near future 
- 
Slovenia and
the Baltic states 
- 
would drastically alter the
Union's character. First of all, it would lead to a
huge financial crisis since the cost of integrating
the four Visegrad countries alone would mean an
increase of 6OVo in the European Union budget
rising to nearly 75Vo by 2000. In the case of
enlargement including all ten ex-communist
applicants, the proportion of poor countries in the
European Union entitled to substantial financial
transfers would rise from 4 out of 15 to 14 out of
25. The present member states would never
accept such a burden and either the subsidies to
farming communities and poorer regions would
be scrapped or it might be decided to create a
second-class membership for new entrants.
58. All member states of the Atlantic Alliance
have stated in public that enlargement of NAIO is
inevitable, but apparently there is no consensus on
how and when. At the North Atlantic Council
meeting in December 1995, Foreign Ministers
decided that the enlargement process would conti-
nue " at a measured pace o'. The Permanent Coun-
cil has now opened an intensified dialogue,
including terms of accession and a possible time-
table, on a sixteen-plus-one basis with each of the
r0
DoCUIIENT 1510
countries which so desfues. The results of these
deliberations will be the subject of a report to be
submitted to the Foreign Ministers at their six-
monthly meeting in December 1996.
59. The " measured pace o'which has now been
adopted has also to do with the need to get a
clearer view on the envisaged parallel relations
with Russia and on the internal development of
some of the main candidate countries.
60. From the moment that NATO launched its
ideas on enlargement, Russia put up opposition in
every possible way. Of course, there cannot be
any doubt that NAIO has no hostile intentions
towards Russia and that the basic objective of any
enlargement would only be to enhance security
for any new member states. On the other hand,
one can imagine that enlargement of NATO to
take in all the former Central European Warsaw
Pact allies of the Soviet Union could create a
feeling of isolation in Russia. Atthe " Wehrkunde "
conference in Munich on3-4 February 1995, Rus-
sia's deputy Defence Minister, Andrei Kokoshin,
repeated that the prospect of NAlO-membership
for countries in Central and Eastern Europe
o' aggravates in Russia the feeling of vulnerability
with unpredictable political implications ".
61. In his address to the December 1995 ses-
sion of the WEU Assembly, the Spanish Defence
Minister, in his capacity as Chairman-in-office of
the WEU Council, rightly said that at the IGC,
member states should achieve a consensus on a
" flexible formula " to facilitate a multi-phase
integration of WEU in the European Union which
should take account of the problems of national
sovereignty raised by defence questions and the
different composition of the two organisations.
62. The United Kingdom Defence Minister,
Michael Portillo, repeating his government's
long-standing view, recently argued for o'a rein-
forced parfrrership between an autonomous WEU
and the European Union and the strict retention of
intergovernmentalism and decision-making by
consensus "6. He added that during its presidency
in the first half of t996, the United Kingdom
would work to " close the operational deficit of
WEU, making sure that we are able to mount
effective, albeit small-scale, operations ".
63. A recent reportT estimates that over a ten-
year period, NAIO expansion will cost western
allies at least $7 billion, which could rise by a fac-
tor of ten if advanced weapons were transferred
and new air bases, weapons depots and trans-
portation equipment purchased to reinforce new
Central and Eastern European member states. In
addition, the new member states would also incur
major expenditures. Poland's share could be some
$150 million per year, without building up new
military capabilities.
@. The main concern over enlargement is that
it could diminish security in Europe, rather than
enhance it, ifno account is taken ofRussia's nega-
tive reactions to NAIO's enlargement projects.
65. Although, in particular since the adoption
of NATO's strategic concept at the Rome summit
meeting, many efforts have been made in order to
adapt the Alliance's strucfires and procedures to
the new security challenges, much still remains to
be done, notably regarding the leadership in the
Alliance, where the United States should encour-
age more assertive ambitions by its European
allies to maintain regional peace.
66. One particularly thorny problem in the
organisation of Europe's defence policy lies in the
many different categories into which the 27 WEU
countries are divided. Apart from the ten member
states which are also members of the European
Union and NAIO, there are five observer states
(Austria, Denmark, Finland, keland, and Sweden)
of which Denmark is a member of the European
Union and NAIO, while the other four are mem-
bers only of the European Union, three associate
members (Norway, Turkey, Iceland) which are
NAIO members and not members of the Euro-
pean Union, and finally, nine associate partners
@ulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania Poland, Romania and Slovakia)
which are neither members of the European
Union, norof NAIO.
67. This diversification is partly the conse-
quence of a declaration by WEU member states
made at Maastricht, in December 1991, reading as
follows:
" States which are members of the Euro-
pean Union are invited to accede to WEU
on conditions to be agreed in accordance
with Article XI of the modified Brussels
Treaty, or to become observers if they so
wish. Simultaneously, other European
member states of NATO are invited to
become associate members of WEU in a
way which will give them the possibility of
participating fully in the activities of WEU.
The member states of WEU assume that
treaties and agreements corresponding with
the above proposals will be concluded
before 31 December 1992."
68. LateL at its May 1994 meeting at Kirch-
berg, Luxembourg, the WEU Council adopted a
document establishing the status of associate part-
ner for the nine Cenfal European states.
6. Atlantic News, 8 December 1995.
7. 'Study on NAIO enlargement: Destabilising Europe "
published by the British American Security Information
Council, London, and the Centre for European Security and
Disarmament, Brussels, December 1995.
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69. In addition to these declarations, there is an
understanding that a country cannot be a member
of WEU without being a member of NATO. This
understanding can lead to the anomalous conse-
quence that non-European Union member states
of the Atlantic Alliance could exert their veto on
WEU membership.
70. Could the cross-relations between member-
ship of the European Union, WEU and NAIO,
which have now been estabtshed result in a situa-
tion where the member states of the European
Union, which are not members of NATO and
WEU, if attacked, would not be covered by any
collective defence agreement? It would be diffi-
cult to imagine that political solidarity, which is at
the heart of European construction, would not
lead to a moral obligation to come to the rescue of
such countries which participate in the integration
process of the European Union as full members.
Or would the consequence of a possible iron rule
of so-called differentiated integration be to leave
those European member states, which do not par-
ticipate fully in the'classic security alliances of
WEU and NA[O, to their own fate? One could
argue that those states do not in any event run the
risk of being attacked, but if that were true, what
is the rationale of two collective defence organisa-
tions to protect Europe and why botherto keep them
alive and even revitalise and restructure them?
71. As regards the enlargement of NAIO, it is
vital to know what kind of protection will be given
to the new member states and what role the United
States intends to play in this protection. Article 5
of the North Atlantic Treaty is formulated in such
a way as to allow for discretionary interpretation.
Article 5 stipulates among other things:
" The Parties agree that an armed attack
against one or more of them in Europe or
North America shall be considered an
attack against them all and consequently
they agree that, if such an armed attack
occurs, each ofthem in exercise ofthe right
of individual or collective self-defence
recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of
the United Nations, will assist the Party or
Parties so attacked by taking forthwith,
individually and in concert with the other
Parties, such action it deems necessary,
including the use of anned force, to restore
and maintain the security of the North
Atlantic arep,."
Article 5 in no way obliges member states to
assist the party or parties attacked through the use
of arrned force.
72. Until now, the Aflantic Alliance has always
maintained that the defence of the allied territory
is based on an appropriate mix of conventional
and nuclear weapons. Is there any guarantee that
the United States is prepared to extend is long-
existing nuclear umbrella to the territories of new
Central European NATO members? Would the
United States' claim that an attack on Berlin or
Paris would be considered as an attack on
Washington be easily extended to new allied
territory?
VI. Wlut prospects for WEU?
(a) Slwrt-term prospects : operatianal capabilitios
73. The British Presidency, which runs to
30 June 1996, has decided to focus its activities on
strengthening WEU's operational capabilities. Its
plans are specific and interesting and cenffe main-
ly on the development of an exercise policy and
the pursuit of the study on European cooperation
in the field of strategic lift (" Eurolift ").
74. In addition, the improvements which were
decided in 1995 and which the previous presiden-
cy began to implement- the creation of an intelli-
gence section in the Planning Cell and of a Situa-
tion Centre 
- 
are continuing and should be
complete by summer 1996. Lastly, following the
permanent establishment of the Torrej6n Satellite
Centre, studies are also continuing to equip the
organisation with independent facilities for the
acquisition of intelligence gathered from space.
75. While modest, these improvements should
not be underestimated. They will in fact provide
the Council in the near future with the material
means it needs for the proper political conduct of
operations in which it decides WEU should be
involved, these being:
- 
the Planning CeIl strengthened by the
intelligence section and the politico-
military group for situation assessments
and re-evaluations;
- 
the Situation Centre endowed with the
facilities needed for presenting miliary
situations and with communications
equipment in order to facilitate direct,
one-to-one and clear dialogue between
the Council's representative 
- 
the " point
of contact " 
- 
and the commander of the
operation;
- 
the acquisition and intelligence struc-
tures in the relevant capital cities and
Satellite Cenfre, working for the bodies
described above.
76. The system as a whole will be evaluated in
June 1996 with a view to the second phase of
Crisex 95196, during which a large multinational
headquarters for the " operations commander " is
to be set up in Metz thus enabling it to liaise with
the Council, another player with an essential role
in the exercise thanks to the new facilities.
t2
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(b) Medium-tennprospech: rehtions with NATO
77. Relations between NATO and WEU are
very closely linked to the new prospects arising
from France's relations with NAIO. The most
striking point is that in agreeing to develop the
" European pillar " within the Alliance,
France is subscribing to the principle whereby, for
the implementation of their individual security
policies, NATO and WEU rely on joint military
assets.
78. This concept entails a number of conse-
quences:
- 
An effort must be made to ensure that the
European pillar is better defined within
the Alliance, and particularly in the
general staffs, so that when the time
comes, Europe will be able, without
major difficulty, to borrow staff from
NATO's military structure to form an
operational chain of command able to
conduct European operations under the
direct political control of the WEU
Council and not subject to the authority
of SACELIR.
- 
The scope of WEU's operational reinforce-
ment is confined to the acquisition of
assets required by the Council. In a fust
analysis, it may be the case that what has
or is being achieved 
- 
the Planning Cell,
Situation Centre, the policy on intel-
ligence, including space-based intelli-
gence 
- 
should meet this requirement'
These assets are essential for they alone
enable the Council, acting in total inde-
pendence, to take political control from
WEU headquarters of military opera-
tions without having to have recourse to
the Alliance's assets.
- 
WEU's fundamental political role conse-
quently becomes very clear and it is in
this context that Europeans must now
find their security and defence identity.
However, this approach is also the most
difficult owing to all the implications for
the member states as regards the pooling
of sovereignty. On the other hand, by rais-
ing the debate to the political plane, this
initiative will put an end to the current
fashion that is becoming all too popular
in WEU member state governmentso
namely that of using alleged operational
deficiencies as an excuse for having cold
feet about Europe. Besides this, recent
crises have served to show that whenever
European heads of state jointly follow a
clearand determined policy gntailing the
unambiguous deployment of military
means, the quality of the political plan is
matched by its military implementation.
79. It is now perfectly clear that until the Euro-
pean Union has acquired sufficient political
stature, Europe should use WEU as a means of
expressing its independence vis-i-vis the United
States.
(c) Long-termprospece: WEU's phce
in the European Union
80. Since the signature of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, which in theory gives the Union a
strong political role, WEU has ceased to be an
o'end in itself " and has become the vehicle that
could be used to achieve that purpose as far as
security and defence aspects are concerned. With
that in mind, and with a view to the intergovern-
mental conference that is to start in March 1996,
the WEU ministers meeting in Madrid on
l5 November 1995 proposed three possible
options for future relations between the two
organisations:
- 
WEU retains its autonomy vis-tr-vis the
Union and confines rapprochement to
the creation or strengthening of a number
of institutional links;
- 
WEU progressively converges with the
Union in three stages: frst, the Union
acquires the power to set general guide-
lines for WEU; second, it issues it with
instructions; and third, it establishes
legally binding ties with it by virtue of
which WEU has an obligation to imple-
ment the Union's decisions on defence
matters;
- 
WEU is integrated in the EuroPean
Union: the modified Brussels Treaty
disappears and the provisions of
Article V thereof 
- 
the collective defence
guarantee 
- 
are incorporated in the
Treaty on European Union, if necessary
with the possibility for those European
Union member states that have a tradi-
tion of neutrality to invoke a clause of
non-participation in collective defence.
81. The frst option is the one preferred by the
United Kingdom which has a preference for using
WEU as a vehicle Europe can use for its human-
itarian duties to the exclusion of any joint combat
mission which, according to the British view,
must remain the sole responsibility of NAf,O.
82. The second option has won varying
degrees of support from the other nine full WEU
member countries, which also concede that the
third option is no more than the logical conclu-
sion of the process but that when it will happen is
impossible to predict.
83. This clearly shows that the issue is no lon-
ger an operational matter as has long been preten-
t3
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ded but that it is political and depends on two
essential questions:
- 
Will it be possible for the European
countries to pool national sovereignty
and make it a collective responsibility to
give birth to a genuine European identity
with all that implies?
- 
Will they be able to take the necessary
measures in time in order to become
totally independent of the United States
and yet keep the transatlantic link intact?
84. Ifthe European countries areresolvedto do
so, they will have no difficulty in making the
necessary adjusfrnents in the relevant institutions.
Many different procedures are conceivable for
glving expression to their common will, ranging
from the traditional intergovernmental system
based on consensus through to a purely commun-
ity system, with the qualified majority voting pro-
cedure lying somewhere between them. It is no
doubt too early for important decisions of this sort
to be taken at the intergovernmental conference.
But it is probably not too late for Europe to assert
its independence vis-i-vis its United States part-
ner and, until the European Union has acquired a
real political dimension, the best existing forum in
which to make that assertion is without doubt
WEU, making it more necessary than ever before
to maintain the principles and structures of that
organisation.
VII. Restructuring the European
defence industry
85. Innumerable reports, resolutionso recom-
mendations and conferences have been devoted to
the issue of reskucturing the European defence
industry. One begins to wonder whether it makes
any sense to raise this question again. hactically
all national defence industries are sustaining
losses, notwithstanding government support or
big state subsidies. According to a recent report
published by the European Commission, the
European Union defence industry cut back
600 000, or 3'lVo, of its 1.6 million jobs in the
period between 1984 and 1992.The debate over
rationalisation, cooperation and mergers still
continues without making any substantial pro-
gress, while time is running out. Defence equip-
ment orders have decreased sharply and conti-
nuing government economies and defence budget
cuts offer few positive prospects for the fore-
seeable future. Competition on the world market
is ruthless and fluctuations in the US dollar
exchange rate have merely aggravated the exis-
ting problems of Europe's defence industry.
86. The European defence industry's main
competitor, the huge United States defence indus-
Ey, has responded to the consequences of the end
of the cold war with a series of giant mergers
which is still in fuU swing.
87. In January 1996, Northrop Grumman
acquired the defence branch of Westinghouse.
Only one week later, Lockheed Martin announced
that it was acquiring Loral's defence and electro-
nics business for $9.1 billion. As the world's
largest defence conglomerate even before the
acqrri5itiol of Loral, it will now become a company
with a $30 billion turnover and a combined ordei
book amounting to a value of $47 billion.
88. The Lockheed Martin deal with Loral is
still subject to scrutiny by the United States anti-
trust authorities, but this does not seem to be a
problem, given government policy to stimulate
the creation of a more efficient and productive
defence industrial base. The next big sweep may
now be a merger between Boeing and McDonnell
Douglas which are both involved in ongoing talks
on this subject.
89. The driving force behind the rationalisation
and mergers is the steep decline in defence pro-
curement in the United States, which now stands
at 4OVo of its $82 billion peak in 1991.
90. One, if not the most obvious, objective of
the United States defence indusfiry has been cost-
cutting, with or without the benefit of mergers.
The recent merger of Northrop, Grumman and
Vought resulted in 14 000 jobs being shed in 1995
from a combined workforce of 53 000. Lockheed
Martin is in the process of reducing its 170 000
worKorce by 12 000 and closing 12 factories.
Between 1990 and 1994, Raytheon cut back the
number of its employees in Massachusefts from
30 000 to 20 000, keeping only one of four
factories.
91. lncreasing exports in order to compensate
for a shrinking home market is anothei main
gbjective of the United States defence industry.
lntensive preqsure on Middle East states, especially
after the Gulf war, has already helped to win back
markets which were in the hands of European
defence industries.
22. In 1995, United States companies exported$11 billion worth of arms, or 49% of the world
market, compared with 32Vo in 1991. The main
losers in this competition were arms producers in
the United Kingdom, France and Germany.
93. European defence equipment cooperation
has a long history: it started with the creation of
FINABEL and the WEU Standing Armaments
Committee in the 1950s, and was followed by the
Independent European Programme Group (EPG)
n l976.In May 1993, the IEPG defence minisrers
agreed to the fransfer of the IEPG to WEU. As a
result of this decision, the Western European
Armaments Group (WEAG) was created, super-
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vised by the defence ministers of the member
states, in coordination with the WEU Council of
Ministerss. Tangible results can be shown, such as
the Franco-British Jaguar fighter-bomber, the
Franco-German Tiger helicopter and the rilateral
programme between France,Italy and ttre United
Kingdom for the Horizon anti-air frigate.
94. Still, there are far too many and too small
defence equipment-producing companies in
Europe, as compared with the United States
defence industry. Europe has seven different ship-
yard companies building submarines compared
to only one in the United States and four tank
manufacturers against one in the United States.
Altogether, Europe has 750 defence industry
establishments against a total of 250 in the
United States.
95. Notwithstanding many efforts in the field
of defence equipment cooperation, Europe is still
struggling to get its act together. National sensiti-
vities apparently continue to be a major hurdle. In
France and the United Kingdom, even mergers
between companies within national borders are
difficult to bring about. European cross-border
rationalisation and consolidation is progressing
even more slowly. The principal obstacles are
political differences: many governments are
anxious to protect national sovereignty and main-
tain a national defence industrial base which in
fact they cannot afford and which also makes
little sense in the present security configuration
marked by differing patterns of ownership and
uncertainty over the future of European procur-
ement.
96. One example of the confused and alarming
situation facing the European armaments industry
is the present competition for missile orders from
the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence. At pre-
sent, three separate competitions are taking place
for an air-launched cruise missile, an air-launched
anti-tank weapon and a long-range air-to-air mis-
sile. The total value of the expected orders is $3.8
billion. The main competitors are United States
and European firms. Decisions on the different
orders, which will be taken in 1996, will deter-
mine whether the United Kingdom retains a signi-
ficant guided missile indusfiry and contribute to
shaping the future of Europe's missile market.
The United Kingdom Minisury of Defence, which
is reviewing its policy regarding the country's
defence indusrial base, is said to be very reluctant
about technologies being retained. The Ministry's
main arguments are that there is a wide variety of
weaponry available from allied nations and that
modern sophisticated weapons are composed of
elements from so many different sources that it is
impossible to ensure fully-secure supplies any-
yty. In the European missile industry, A6rospa-
tiale and Deutsche Aerospace are now merging
their missile activities and, in the framework of
Franco-German cooperation in observation satel-
lites, their satellite business as well, but more
long-term consolidation has not yet taken place.
In the abovementioned competition, a team
consisting of British Aerospace and Matra is
offering a version of the French Apache cruise
missile but Matra has announced that a merger of
the missile activities of the two companies will
not take place if they do not win the contract.
97. Regrettably, too little headway has been
made in the creation of a European Armaments
Agency which should concentrate its efforts on
the strengthening of European cooperation on
armamentso improving the defence technology
base and supporting the creation of a Ewopean
defence equipment market. In their meeting on
20 October, the national armaments directors of
the thirteen WEAG countries were unable to
agree on a WEU charter for a European Arma-
ments Agency which was required to give the
a9ency legal personality and a basis for financial
means. Discussions are now taking place to create
an agency with reduced tasks and responsibilities.
France and Germany, which are both determined
to make quick progress in the process of coopera-
tive equipment procurement, have now created a
Franco-German arms agency which started its
activities on I January 1996. With the reduction
of defence procurement costs as its main object-
ive, the agency will be responsible for the mana-
gement of bilateral and multilateral arms cooper-
ation prograrrunes, in which both countries are
involved. At a later stage, it will also be respon-
sible for the maintenance of a bilateral defence
indusrial base, streamlining of procurement pro-
cedures and coordination of research and deve-
lopment spending. Both founding nations have
stated that their armaments agency will be open to
other European allies for participationo in which
case, a common understanding will be required as
regards the legal charter.
98. Regarding Europeos defence industry, the
IGC cannot ignore the role of Article 223 of the
Treaty of Rome, which excludes the arms industry
from the European Union's area of competence.
With considerably diminished defence equipment
orders coming from their own governments, many
defence industrialists are wondering whether the
traditional national protectionist approach is still
worthwhile. Above all else, the defence industry
is in favour of a procurement discipline with an
unambiguous preference to " buy European " but
such a regime could only be imposed if Article
223 was amended so that decisions concerning
8. This subject, and the present situation in the European
defence industry, are discussed in detail in the report
" WEAG: the course to be followed " by }vlrs Guirado and
Lord Dundee, WEU Assembly Document 1483.
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this sector of industy were no longer a matter of
national sovereignty.'
99. On 25 January 1996, the European Com-
mission published a report in which it suggested
opening tendering for government defence
contracts to full competition. The Commission
believes that extending the European Union's
public procurement rules to the defence sector in
order to ensure that all companies have a chance
to tender could result in dramatic cost reductions
and greatly improve the competitiveness of
Europe's defence industry. It claims that the ratio-
nalisation of defence procurement could save
national budgets as much as 11 billion ecus ($14.5
billion) a year. When presenting the report, the
Industry Commissioner, Martin Bangemann,
rightly said that " a common foreign and security
policy loses its significance if Europe does not
have its own anns competence "e.
100. On the other hand, there is a growing feel-
ing among both governments and defence indus-
tries in Europe that a European protectionist rule
may have to be established in order to grant the
European defence industry the time it needs for
restnrcnuing.
101. While the United States always insists on
the importance of two-way traffic in defence
equipment cooperation, there are serious doubts
in Europe as to whether it actually makes a
serious effort to put this policy into effect. It
should be noted that from 1988 to 1992, European
Union member states imported almost $18 billion
in arms from the United States while exporting
less than $l billion to the United States.
VIII. Milirory airffi- the FLA programme
lO2. Based on European experience in the Gulf
war, the WEU Assembly started to insist on the
importance of an increased European military afu-
Lift capability at its June 1991 session. Since then,
it has continuously given its full support to what
has become the future large aircraft (FLA) pro-
grarnme, mostrecently in the report " Military air-
lift 
- 
prospects for Europe "ro.
103. It should be stressed again here that
military airlift is of prime importance in crisis
management, both from a tactical and strategic
point of view, as has clearly been demonstrated in
recent and present-day crises and conflicts.
l0/. Furope must strengthen and develop its
potential in military transport aircraft, both in
order to be able to cope independently with
9. Financial Ttrnes, 26 January 1996.
10. Document 1484: report submitted on behalf of the Tech-
nological and Aerospace Committee by Mr Alexander,
Rapporteur.
future contingencies and to maintain European
lndustrial capability in the face of competition
from the Untied States and Russia in military air-
lift. At stake are not only Europe's defence cap-
abilities, but also the survival of its aeronautiis
industry.
105. The FLA progmrnme was launched in 1985
in the framework of the Independent European
Programme Group (EPG) which has now been
transformed into the Western European Arma-
ments Group (WEAG). Participants in the
development of the FLA are the Airbus partners
A6rospatiale (France), British Aerospace (United
Kingdom), CASA (Spain), Alenia (Italy), Daimler-
Benz Aerospace (Germany) and their associate
partners, Flabel (Belgium), OGMA (Portugal)
and Tusas (Turkey).
106. The aircraft's characteristics meet Euro-
pean requirements as planned for the medium and
long term; it has a hold capacity of 342m3 and a
payload of up to 32 tonnes. With a 16-tonne load
the FLA can cover a distance of 5 835 km (or
7 595 km in convoy) and fly at a cruising speed of
Mach 0.68-Mach 0.72.Its manufacture i[volves
modern technology such as the use of new com-
posites and aluminium alloys and, recently, turbo-
props have been fitted.
IO7. The FLA is expected to cost around $80
million - twice as much as the Lockheed C-130J
but three times less than the McDonnell Douglas
9-17. The countries participating in this programme
have a combined requirement of around 300 air-
craft and other European countries are perceived
as, potential customers. In 1995, the management
of the FLA prograrnme was fiansferred to a Euro-
pean consortium through the creation of the Air-
bus Military Company (AMC).
108. At present, the FLA prograrnme is at the
stage of a feasibility study. The first flight is sche-
duled for early 2OO2 and first deliveries are plan-
ned to take place in2OM.
10?. The FLA will provide the air forces of par-
ticipating countries with modern, high-perfor-
mance means adapted to their needs and will
make for real European interoperabitity in mili-
lary airlift; this is an important step towards an
independent European defence capability.
lJ0._ Beingable to rely upon autonomous military
airlift is a vital element of,, Europe's operational
capability. The countries participating in *re fl-e
programme should proceed with the aircraft's
development in top gear, lest some of them with
urgent requirements turn to foreign competitors
such as the Lockheed Martin C-130J H-ercules
or a version of the Antonov An-70 adapted to
western requirements.
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IX. Earopean military obsentation satellite
cooperatian
111. In October 1995, Helios 1A, the first French
military intelligence satellite in which both Italy
and Spain participate, started trials and in early
1996 it became operational. This satellite pro-
vides these countries with a new asset to help in
forecasting, detecting and monitoring crisis situa-
tions. At the same time, a memorandum of
understanding allows WEU to share at least part
of the information obtained. The companion satel-
lite Helios 1B, with roughly the same characteris-
tics, is to be launched in 1997-98.
ll2. European military satellite cooperation was
given a major boost when, at their summit meet-
ing of 7 December 1995 in Baden-Baden, France
and Germany agreed to cooperate closely in the
field of satellites. The main focus of Franco-
German cooperation will be the development of a
FF 11 000 million Helios 2 observation satellite
with France as lead contractor, a FF 13 000
million Horus radar observation satellite with
Germany as lead contractor and a cooperative
study with regard to the possible development of
data-relay satellites.
113. Helios 2, d'ue to replace Helios I after the
year200O, will include many improvements, such
as night observation with its infra-red capability.
After the year 2005, the Horus radar observation
satellite will provide an all-weather day and night
observation capability.
Il4. Clearly, the Franco-German satellite
cooperation programme is an important step
towards the emergence of a European satellite
system. Both partrrers share the conviction that a
cofllmon European security and defence policy, in
particular in the fields of crisis prevention, crisis
management and peacekeeping obliges Euro-
peans to have a reliable and independent space
observation capability at their disposal.
115. Both France and Germany are prepared to
share their satellite cooperation programme with
other WEU member states.
116. At its meeting in Madrid on 14 November
1995, the WEU Ministerial Council instructed its
Space Group to define the basic conditions for
" possible WEU participation in a developing
multilateral European prograrnme and to study
questions related to a possible WEU ground seg-
ment, taking account of existing ground segments
within WEU nations ".
lI7. In fact, in its report the Space Group will
have to establish which states are to participate in
Helios 2 under WEU auspices. Other issues to be
discussed are the characteristics of the satellite
observation programme. Will WEU only need
optical images or also infra-red and radar; should
data-relay satellites be included in the pro-
gramme? A primordial issue will also be the cost
of WEU participation in Helios 2 and the sharing
of the financial burden between the various parti-
cipants.
118. Inevitably, the Space Group will also have
to discuss whether observers, associate members
and associate partners would be able to participate
in a WEU satellite pro$amme.
lI9. There are other issues which the Space
Group may not have a remit to discuss, but which
are still vitally important for the enhancement of
WEU's operational role.
l2O. At present both the Planning Cell in Brus-
sels and the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrej6n are
under the Council's custody which in fact geatly
restricts their activities. The Satellite Centre,
which has no proper action plan, is under the
Council's strict orders and cannot do much more
than wait for instructions, which are rare because
of the lack of consensus in the Council. The pre-
sent MOU between the three Helios 1A states and
WEU is also too restrictive for effective opera-
tions.
l2l. Nobody would venture to question the ulti-
mate responsibility of the Council, but the present
stict interpretation of the Council's responsibility
is resulting in the immobility of organs which are
still in. a stage of development and, hopefully,
expansron.
122. In the near future, a direct link should be
established between the Planning Cell and the
Satellite Centre, through which the Planning Cell
should have direct access to the satellite imagery
available at the Centre, including the possibility
of questioning the Centre on imagery-related
lssues.
123. WEU should also renegotiate the existing
memorandum of understanding regarding Hetos
1A with a view to giving the Cenfre the possibility
of programming part of the activities of the Hetos
18 successor satellite which is to be launched in
the 1997-98 timeframe.
X. Conclusionstl
124. There is no denying the complex political
and strategic backgtound to the construction of a
co[lmon European defence. For forty years, the
threat of Soviet aggression was a factor making
for European unity and transatlantic solidarity in
the interest of a common defence.
11. Most of this chapter is taken from the article by Nicole
Gnessoto entitled "Vers une politique europdenne de ddfense
commune ", which featured in Ramses 1996 
- 
World Report
on tlte economic system and strategies, published by the
IFRI, Dunod, Paris, 1995.
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125. Today, crises that may arise, such as in the
example of Bosnia, do not inspire the same soli-
darity among Europeans because they are piece-
meal and vary in nature.
" 126.T\e fact that European security has lost its
unity of purpose makes it all ttre more difFrcult to
develop a common defence policy.
127. TWo series of questions will dominate the
1996 intergovernmental conference: institutional
aspects 
- 
in particular, how decisions on defence
matters are to be taken and links between the
European Union and WEU 
- 
and operational
aspects, notably in the context of relations
between WEU and NATO.
128. The institutional issue is not confined to a
discussion on decision-making methods because
no state will ever agree to its soldiers dying as a
result of a qualified majority vote if it is not in its
national or vital interests.
129. The member states of the European Union
do not all have the same status: four of the fifteen
countries are neutral and do not belong to the
military alliance in WEU. Can a European Union
country that is not a member of WEU veto the lat-
ter? Clearly, it cannot. The major issue therefore
concerns the links to be established between the
Union and WEU. One possible solution would be
to adjust the rule of consensus in the European
Council so that only countries that are both EU
and WEU members would qualify for a right of
veto on defence matters. "
130. But the development of a common Euro-
pean defence policy also entails clarifying the
maffer of operational means that can actually be
used by Europe, which does not as yet have sfra-
tegic lift capabilities, genuine logistics capacities
or satellite intelligence facilities.
" 131.On what conditions can Europeans use
NATO assets, without European command and
control, where the United States decides not to
take part in a specific operation?
132. Is it possible for NAIO to have sole res-
ponsibility for military operations in which the
United States decides to participate, while at the
same time building up within the Alliance the
conditions for genuine European autonomy in
defence matters where the United States chooses
not to be involved? "
133. Since January 1994 when a proposal was
made at the NATO summit in Brussels to create
the CJTF, forces ' separable but not separate from
NATO ', a solution has still not been found to put
it into effect because of the United States' refusal
to place its forces under European command,
which would be the logical course of action.
Could a way out of this deadlock be found in a
compromise consisting in giving these forces a
'NATO label' at the next NATO summit in
Berlin?
" l34.There should be nothing more normal than
Europeans being able to use NATO assets for a
European initiative given that together they make
up about 807o of that organisation's conventional
means. The main problem is posed by those
NATO assets which are mainly or exclusively
American (intelligence, communications, opera-
tions confrol) and which Europeans might need to
carry out an operation under their own responsi-
bility.
135. Negotiation, already difficult when there is
mere indifference on the part of the United States,
would become explosive in the event of major
political Euro-American disagreement. o' One can
imagine for instance what could happen in less
than a year's time in Bosnia with IFOR when the
Americans withdraw their GIs after having helped
to rearm the Bosnians on a massive scale in order
to restore a balance of weapons in the region.
What way out will be left for the Europeans? Will
they leave or will they stay with or without NATO
operational means available to them? It is under-
standable that this problem is of concern to Europe.
" It is hard to see how an operation in which
Europeans alone would be taking real risks could
be under anything other than exclusive European
command and control. [t is therefore necessary to
build in a European politico-operational echelon,
and in particular a European command answer-
able to a European political body, without how-
ever desfroying NAIO. "
136. Another question concerns the missions of
any future European defence regardless of whe-
ther it is organised within the European Union or
remains part of a reformed NATO. This question
has deliberately been put to one side by the coun-
tries concerned " since there is now a consensus to
limit such missions to the management of per-
ipheral crises ('non-Article 5 missions') while
reserving for NATO the mission of defending the
integrity and survival of European territories('Article 5 missions '). This distinction clearly
has a political basis: its purpose is to avoid giving
the impression that WEU and NATO are in com-
petition, so as not to weaken NATO and, conse-
quently, the United States' commiunent in Europe.
This explains why no European state defends the
idea of a European defence policy whose mission
would also be to defend Europe. The WEU
Petersberg Declaration of June 1993, which did
however postulate s'reh a possibility, is nowadays
given a narrower interpretation as far as a
common defence is concerned.
137. But the distinction between ' Article 5 '
and 'non-Article 5 ' missions is to a large extent
artificial and its political advantage 
- 
not giving
the impression of competition between Europe
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and the United States 
- 
holds out little prospect of
lasting solutions. In the frst place, management
of the Bosnian crisis shows that a peacekeeping
initiative can involve combat operations that
closely resemble collective defence missions: can
Europe claim to assume its own milita.y responsi-
bility in the management of post-communist
crises while still relying on NATO to remove
European forces Aoni the theare of operation in
the event of a conflict escalating or of their inter-
vention failing? Secondly, the WEU Treaty is
based on the obligation in Article V of collective
seH-defence that is at least as binding as that of
NATO, if not more so. However, no clause in the
treaty contains an obligation for the member
states to manage the crises of other parties.
Moreover, if WEU's role was confined solely to
crisis management, it could without further ado
admit any European country as a member without
the question of its membership of NAIO arising
at the same time. But this is far from the reality.
Two possible conclusions can be drawn from
these observations: the first is that any ambition to
create a European defence is in effect limited to
'non-Article 5 ' missions, which means it could
perfectly well be organised outside WEU, for
example by creating a peacekeeping force depend-
ing directly on the European Council itself. This
is in fact one of the options being studied by the
European Commission.
138. The alternative is that WEU should be
considered as an indispensable organisation for
developing a common defence policy and this can
be done only on the basis of a global definition of
defence, including Article 5. A crucially impor-
tant question is whether it is politically acceptable
for the European Union to endorse flagrant
inequalities in security between its member states
depending on whether or not they are covered by
the NATO Treaty and enjoy United States protec-
tion. The ideal scenario for building Europe's
security architecture would be one in which the
frontiers of the European Union eventually cor-
respond with those of NAIO. But is this likely to
happen? The Baltic states and Romania, which
should be entitled to membership of the Union, do
not necessarily have the same prospects in relation
to NATO. Unless the process of Union enlargement
is brought to a halt, the Union will one day have to
raise the question of its own collective defence
capability, in other words of the inclusion of an
Article 5 in the Treaty on European Union itself.
139. A new impetus to two-way traffic between
the Europe Union and the United States in mutual
defence and global cooperation is the only cred-
ible option in the long term if the purpose behind
the notion of a Euro-American partnership is to
promote fruitful cooperation between two part-
ners with equal rights and powers. If that is to be
achieved, the construction of a genuine European
Union with all the diplomatic and military means
of power at its disposal is also a way, and perhaps
in the end the only way, of saving the alliance
with the United States from the existential crisis
besetting it now that the original threat that gave it
meaning has disappeared. "
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APPENDX I
Organising securily in Europe 
- 
defence aspects
Contribation from Mr Skarphddinsson, Iceland (Associate member)
I. Introdactian
l. At Maastricht, the Ewopean member states
of NATO still outside the European Union were
invited to become associate members of WEU.
The new concept of associate membership inclu-
ded a generous array of privileges that enabled the
new partners to participate fully in the activities of
WEU. The respective nations 
- 
Tirrkey, Norway
and lceland 
- 
all accepted the invitation. Due to
their geographical positions, all three are ofstrate-
gic importance to the Atlantic Alliance and all three
share a distinguished record as stalwarts of NAf,O.
2. The relationship at once promised to deve-
lop into a marriage of mutual convenience. From
WEU's point of view, associate membership for
the remaining European members of NATO fur-
ther emphasised its declared intention to become a
fue European pillar of the transatlantic partner-
ship with the involvement of those nations that
remained outside the European Union. Simulta-
neously, it consolidated what were already firm
relations between NAIO and WEU. For the asso-
ciate members, their new status within WEU was
equally advantageous, creating opportunities to
engage in close dialogue with the full members of
WEU and thereby to wield new influence in the
wider context of the European security architec-
ture. So far, initial expectations have been ful-
filled. The new associate members have become
active participants at all levels of WEU and view
it as a welcome and significant addition to their
European relations.
3. Paradoxically, when WEU so generously
offered a special status to the three NAIO part-
ners, it declared at the same time its intention " to
build up WEU in stages as the defence component
of the European Union ". On that basis, WEU
subsequently embarked on reviewing its relation-
ship with the European Union and formal propo-
sals on the future role of WEU within the frame-
work of European security will be put to the
intergovernmental conference in 1996.
II. Flawed proposals
4. In the context of the Maastricht Declara-
tion, it is not surprising that ideas being floated on
the future role of WEU and most recently put
forward by the Reflection Group, suggest the
integration of WEU as an intrinsic part of the
European Union. Such a development is, how-
ever, unlikely to serve the interests of the new
associate members and in the long term will not
serve to strengthen the security of European citi-
zens. In fact, there are several arguments against
WEU being reduced to a formal defence pillar of
the European Union.
(a) The transatlnntb link
5. The strongest argument relates to the
importance of the Atlantic Alliance in the collec-
tive defence of Europe. Despite the recent thaw in
East-West relations, the transatlantic link still
remains vital for democratic stability in Western
Europe. That is the brutal lesson of European his-
tory this century and it is being demonstrated yet
again in Bosnia at this very moment. It is not pos-
sible, therefore, to design a credible security
structure in Europe without a direct engagement
by the United States. Consequently, it is essential
that any change in the role of WEU must not be at
the expense of NATO.
6. It is a false prophet who claims it is pos-
sible to ensure that the proposed changes in WEU
will not have a negative effect on the transatlantic
link. In fact, it can be argued that if WEU is trans-
formed into the military organ of the European
Union, responsibility for the collective defence of
Europe would, to some extento gradually shift
from NAIO to the Union. In this context, it should
not be overlooked that a new generation ofpolicy-
makers in the United States is already sceptical
about the expensive involvement of the United
States in Europe. A European Union with an inte-
grated military component would give short-
sighted American politicians added reason to
argue that Europe should be left to take care of its
own security... and shoulder the expense.
7. Such a development would confuse the
division of labour between NATO and a changed
European Union, and thus tend to undermine the
present level of real security. In the long run, it
could also place a heavy financial burden on the
European allies. In military terrns, WEU and its
member states are vastly inferior to the Alliance.
In fact, to replicate its operational capability in
terrns of heavy lift, communications and common
logistics would cost Europe $100 billion a year.
This means that average European spending on
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defence would have to rise by 60%o.That is simply
politically inconceivable. Apart from the vital
security factor, $100 billion per year is a sharp
reminder of what is at stake.
8. The Atlantic Alliance may be a little frayed
at the edges. However, the experience of the last
fiffry years has proved it beyond any doubt. There
is an American saying: " If it ain't broke, don't fix
it. " The present defence structure of Europe,
through its reliance on the transatlantic link, is in
perfect working order. It doesn't need to be fixed.
(b) WEU 
- 
a true European pilhr?
9. From the point of view of the associate
members, a variety of problems will arise if res-
ponsibility for the present defence cooperation
system in WEU is carried out directly under Euro-
pean Union auspices. For example, how would
the interests of NAIO members that are outside
the European Union be taken into account? How
would WEU under such circumstances continue
to fulfil its role as the European pillar of NATO?
It thus appears, that the proposed change would
literally exclude the associate members from
having a say in decisions that would nevertheless
directly affect their interests.
10. In political terms, it would be very difficult
for some associate members to reconcile domestic
opposition to membership of the European Union
with an unchanged relationship with WEU.
Would the Norwegian public, for example, with
its decisive no-vote against European Union
membership, be prepared to be an active player
inside the formal defence institute of the Euro-
pean Union? Most certainly, the Icelandic govern-
ment of the day would hesitate to propose an
unchanged relationship with such a drastically
changed WEU.
11. The possibility remains, therefore, that
there might be a change in active participation
within WEU and even in the formal status of some
of the present associate members. Such a develop-
ment, where member states of NATO would be
forced to reduce their level of participation in
WEU, would hardly increase the credibility of
WEU as a sfrong European pillar of the Atlantic
Alliance. That would not be at all conducive to
inspiring trust in the American partners in the
Atlantic Alliance. Hence, in the long term, the pro-
posed changes could have a detrimental influence
in terms of European defence and security.
(c) The neutral mzmberc
12. Integration of WEU in the European Union
also poses difficult internal problems for the
Union itself. At present, four of the European
Union member states are avowed neutral coun-
tries and as such do not participate in military
organisations. None is a member of NAIO and
none an active participant in WEU beyond
observer status. Still another member, Denmark,
although not a neufral state, has for its own rea-
sons opted for non-active partnership in WEU as
an observer. Therefore one-third of the fifteen
members of the European Union are at present not
prepared to take on the commifinents in defence
matters deriving from full membership of WEU.
The position of these five countries is in most
cases based on a long-standing tradition and on
history and it is irrational to anticipate a complete
turnaround in their defence policies. Conse-
quently, the neutral member states can hardly be
expected to accept new defence responsibilities
deriving from the transformation of WEU
into a formal European Union pillar, unless its
present defence policy is altered, and presumably
weakened. In that case, the proposed change
would not only concern the European Union but
the common defence policy of the Atlantic Allian-
ce and obviously affect not only the defence inter-
ests of the present associate members of WEU,
but of the whole of Europe as well.
(d) The lcelandb anglz
13. Geography is often a powerful constraint
on the formulation of foreign policy. Whilst the
world may be in a flux and political systems
emerge and vanish, the facts of geography remain
immutable and constant. It is perhaps no longer
seemly to quote communist sayings, but the apt
observation by Stalin springs to mind: " No one
can be blamed for geography being what it is. "
14. Iceland is a case in point. Its geographical
position, straddling the transatlantic ridge be-
tween East and West, in many ways symbolises its
relationship with the outside world. Iceland
regards itself as a European nation and has striven
to establish close links with the member states of
the European Union in a wide variety of fields.
Similarly, when Iceland, which has a bilateral
defence agreement with the United States, was
invited to join WEU as an associate member, it
accepted, viewing associate status as a way of
consolidating its links with the European pillar of
NAIO.
15. Being forced to side with either Europe or
North America would be a disastrous choice for
Iceland. For this reason, it has come to view the
maintenance and promotion of the transatlantic
partnership as a priority in its security and defence
interests. This was a lesson that was presumably
learnt by Iceland's allies alread twice in this cen-
tury and resulted in the creation of NATO. Of
course, it is the prerogative of the members of the
European Union to decide for themselves on their
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own corlmon defence policy. As they forge ahead
they should, however, bear in mind not only their
own, but also the wider security interests of Europe
as a whole.
III. Future development
16. WEU is already developing along sensible
lines. Carefully but sl6wly it his s-tartedio partici-
pate in solving regional conflicts within Europe.
Its involvement in the embargo in the Adriatic, in
monitoring compliance with the economic sanc-
tions on the Danube and in the peacekeeping ope-
ration in Mostar reflects a future in which WEU
could play a very important role in performing
duties which the Alliance is either not prepared or
not suited to undertake. The division of labour
between NATO and WEU must be clear, however,
and absolute responsibility for Europe's common
defence and security must continue to rest on the
shoulders of NATO. Nevertheless, a strong
emphasis on the transatlantic link should not in
the least deter WEU from developing its own
operational capability. On the confrary, it should
strive to increase its military capacity but take
good care to avoid unnecessary duplication of
existing systems. Instead, the reciprocal use of
existing structures should be adopted.
17. Finally, a decision to subordinate WEU to
the European Union would only serve to create
new divisions, rather than to promote a shared
security identity among all European states,
whether inside or outside the European Union.
Placing WEU under the aegis of the Union would
therefore not be conducive to our shared security
interests, including the transatlantic dimension.
Instead our time would be befter spent ensuring
that WEU and NAIO, two organisations that have
served us well in the pasto can work together to
safeguard our common interests in the future.
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APPENDIX tr
Organising security in Europe 
- 
defence aspects
Contribution from Mr Onyszkiewicz, Poland (Associate partner)
1. The collapse of communism in Poland in
summer 1989 started a chain reaction resulting in
the end of the bi-polar division of Europe: Germ-
any was reunited and the former Soviet satellites
regained full independence. The break-up of the
Soviet Union in 1991 brought into existence a
range of countries which had either never existed
before or had disappeared from the maps half a
century earlier.
This entirely new political situation presen-
ted a formidable challenge - to redefine and reshape
the political and security architecture of a newly
emerging Europe. The major problem was to meet
the security needs of Central European countries
which once again found themselves in the familiar
and highly uncomfortable situation of being sand-
wiched between trvo major political and military
entities 
- 
in this instance between NATO, the
European Union and WEU to the west and Russia
to the east.
2. With a choice of several 
- 
at least theoreti-
cal 
- 
options, the concept of reforming the War-
saw Pact and changing it into a genuine alliance
based on true partnership, was never even consi-
dered for obvious historical reasons. Similarly,
the option of declaring neutrality did not suit
the prevailing conviction that, for a country in a
geographical location such as Poland, neutrality
would have no practical meaning.
For similar reasons, maintaining a position
of non-alignment also seemed unacceptable. This
would place a country such as Poland in a " grey
zorre" of buffer states with all the negative conse-
quences. Such a status would not be conducive to
internal stability. It would push the country into a
position of permanent dissent regarding the
influence of powerftrl neighbours, both close and
more distant. Hence, it was strongly felt that
Polish security interests could be safeguarded
effectively only within a coalition framework.
3. The best solution came as an inevitable
consequence of a major political decision which
was so natural that it was more or less taken the
very day following Poland's newly found full
independence and was virtually unanimous. This
was the decision to join the process of European
integration. In concrete terms, this meant Poland
embarking on a quest for membership of the
European communities.
The reasons were very profound and basic.
The document entitled " Tenets of the Polish
security policy ", adopted in 1992 by the govern-
ment and the President of the republic, puts them
in the following form:
" We can overcome our civilisational delay
and become an equal parmer for the devel-
oped nations only through the swift and
effective incorporation of Poland into the
economic and political process of West
European integration. Voluntary isolation
and failure to exploit the oppornrnity of fast
development would undoubtedly lead in
time to the marginalisation of the Polish
economy and the pauperisation of its society
- 
which in turn could lead to a loss of free-
dom and sovereignty. Ties with the EC and
subsequent full membership will contribute
to a decision about our participation in the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, if we
do not become a member beforehand. "
As early as 1991, Poland started negotia-
tions on an association with the European Union
and this came into force on I February 1994. On
8 April 1994, Poland officially applied for full
membership of the European Union.
Poland has also made it absolutely clear
that it will seek full membership of WEU as soon
as possible.
4. Of the countries aspiring to membership of
NATO and WEU, it is Poland that perhaps has the
most exposed geographical location. It is worth
mentioning that there have not really been any
local conflicts involving Poland or Polish territo-
ry. For the last 300 years, since Poland lost its sta-
tus as a European power and could no longer
single-handedly confront adversaries, there have
been many wars on its territory but all of them
were major conflicts involving the big European
powers. Because of this, one can say that the
" Balkan scenario " is not relevant to Central
Europe.
On the other hand, Poland is by far the lar-
gest would-be member of the European Union
and WEU. In relation to the other Visegrad coun-
tries, Poland's population and surface area are by
far the largest. This is why Poland in WEU and in
NATO would make a quantitative positive differ-
ence to both alliances and to the security environ-
ment in Europe.
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5. It is important to note that, as was rightly
mentioned in the Appendix to the report on
" Security and Military Cooperation in the Baltic
Sea area ", submitted by Mr Marten to the forty-
first ordinary session of the Assembly, Poland has
exemplary relations with all its neighbours, based
on bilateral treaties. Neither are there any pro-
blems with minorities in Poland or Polish minori-
ties abroad. Poland is actively developing a pro-
cess of reconciliation with Germany and similar
actions are under way vis-i-vis Ukraine. Poland is
also engaged in intensive dialogue with Russia.
Besides its very good relations with the United
States, Poland is strongly committed to devel-
oping Franco-Polish-German cooperation known
as the " Weimar triangle " and to increasing even
further its contacts with the United Kingdom and
other WEU and European Union members.
Over the whole period and despite several
changes of government, Poland has followed a
consistent, predictable policy aimed at coopera-
tion with all its neighbours, in particular with the
West, and at membership of both NATO and the
European Union/WEU.
6. To better understand the Polish security
environment, it is worth recalling that under the
CFE Treaty, Polish holdings of some of the treaty
limited equipment are as follows: 1730 tanks,
1 610 pieces of artillery,2l5O ACVs. These
limits, although higher than the holdings of many
WEU countries, should be compared with the hol-
dings of some of Poland's other neighbours such
as Belarus which, though four times smaller, has
I 800 tanks, I 615 pieces of artillery 2 600 ACVs;
in the Kaliningrad area there are 870 HBTs and
980 ACVs''.
7. As has been said, Poland sees the develop-
ment of its prosperity, civilisation, stability and
security as indivisibly linked to its membership of
the European Union, WEU and NATO. The same
applies to a range of other Central and Eastern
European countries.
However, the prospect of former Soviet
satellite countries joining NAIO is strongly oppo-
sed by Russia. In a report entitled 'o Poland-
NATO ", a group of prominent Polish politicians
and analysts said Russian policy towards Poland
and Central Europe is:
'o ... subordinated to Russian blueprints for
Europe's future geopolitics. The maximum
plan is preservation of a belt of militarily,
politically and economically weak states
and gadual expansion of Russia's presence
in this area until its effective power enables
it to redraw spheres of influence in this
region. Thus, Poland's aspirations and
12. The Military Balance 1995196, lnternational lnstitute for
Security Studies.
security interests are freated by Russia as a
threat to these long-range designs. Fears
are also voiced of the possibility of Poland
and other Central European countries being
used as instruments by the West for gaining
influence in Ukraine and other former
Soviet republics. Russia's attitude to
advancement of stability and wellbeing in
Central Europe remains in those circum-
stances ambivalent, although there is a
noteworthy absence of objections to expan-
sion of the European Union and even
WEU. The question is, might this be due to
Russia's own (negative) assessment of the
changes of expansion of these institutions
by the end of the centuy? " 13
In this context, it is worth quoting theses on
Russia and NATO of the Russian Council on
Foreign and Defence Potcy, where one can find
the following assessment of NATO enlargement:
" Elimination of the belt of the de facto
neufial and, as a rule, weakly armed states
which has taken shape in the centre of
Europe following the demise of the War-
saw Pact, will deprive Russia of a major
advantage achieved by its sorting out ofthe
cold war. "
In Munich, at the beginning of February,
Andrei Kokoshin, Deputy Minister of Defence of
the Russian Federation, once again tried to pro-
mote the concept akin to the " Finlandisation of
Central and Eastern Europe ".
8. There is no doubt that Russia's relatively
" soft " approach to EU/rfiIEU enlargement is due
to the following factors:
- 
full membership of WEU is available
only to countries which are both in the
European Union and NATO. So, if
NATO enlargement could be effectively
blocked, there would be no WEU en-
largement;
- 
WEUhas (as yet) no military structure of
its own and the United States is not a
member;
- 
there is a perception in Russia that WEU
is less cohesive and less efficient than
NAIO, partly due to the absence of clear
leadership;
- 
the process of the enlargement of the
European Union will be lengthy and so
this issue could be handled later.
9. As an alternative to quick NATO (and
WEU) enlargement, a concept of security guaran-
tees for Central and Eastern European countries is
13. Poland-NATO report, Euro-Atlantic Association
(Poland, 1995).
24
APPENDX II DOCIJMENT 1510
advanced by the Russians. Official statements and
semi-official documents contain several possible
options such as bilateral security guarantees by
Russia and NATO, unilateral guarantees by
NATO or unilateral guarantees by the United
States, Germany or other states, possibly codified
as ffeaties.
This type of solution is completely unac-
ceptable. First, the " paper " security guarantees
have a very poor reputation in countries such as
Poland. Second, if security guarantees were to be
serious, then the best way to make them would be
to bring the countries concerned into a military
alliance and give them cover under Article V of
the modified Brussels Treaty or Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty.
Security guarantees which appear to be just
a formality without any real commitment are
worse than none at all.
10. The main reasons for Russia's objections to
NATO enlargement (and, undoubtedly, in future
to that of WEU) are political as well as psycholo-
gical. Russia feels that the enlargement of Euro-
pean and Atlantic institutions may create a secu-
rity system in which there will be no place for
Russia. So it is of utrnost importance to develop
good relations between NAIO, WEU and Russia.
However, it is unrealistic to hope that Russia can
give its consent to NATO enlargement or (when it
ceases to be a theoretical question and becomes a
real one) to WEU expansion.
11. The much-needed cooperation between
WEU and Russia should be copied to produce a
similar scheme for Ukraine. It is worth mention-
ing in this context that Poland is trying to develop
intense cooperation with its neighbour, including
cooperation in military areas. As an example,
there is a plan (already approved by both govern-
ments) to set up a Polish-Ukrainian battalion ear-
marked for peacekeeping operations. Similarly, a
Polish-Lithuanian battalion will be set up for the
same purpose.
12. The issue of NATO enlargement remains
cenEal to the future of European security archi-
tecture. It is ofdirect and very profound relevance
to the future of WEU. It was duly noted in the
strrdy on NATO enlargement. Paragraph 20 of this
study reads as follows:
" All fulImembers of WEU are also mem-
bers of NAIO. Because of the cumulative
effect of the security safeguards of Article
V of the modified Brussels Treaty and of
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the
maintenance of this linkage is essential.
Both enlargement processes should, there-
fore, be compatible and mutually support-
ive. At the same time, WEU is being deve-
loped as the defence component of the
European Union, which strengthens the
relationship between the two organisations.
An eventual congruence of European mem-
bership in NATO, EU and WEU would
have positive effects on European security.
The Alliance should, at an appropriate time,
give particular consideration to countries
with a perspective of European Union mem-
bership and which have shown an interest injoining NAIO, in order to consider on the
basis indicated in this study how they can
contribute to transatlantic security within
the Washington Treaty and to determine
whether to invite them to join NAIO. "
13. Poland is one of several Cenfral and Eas-
tern European countries which openly declares its
intention to become a member of NATO and a full
member of WEU. According to the decision of the
ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council
held in Brussels on 5 December 1995, intensive
consultations with Poland and other interested
countries will begin as the next stage of the
ongoing process of NAIO enlargement.
Negotiations on the admission to the Euro-
pean Union of new countries such as Poland will
begin, as was clearly indicated, no later than six
months after the completion of the 1996 inter-
governmental conference. There are hopes that
NATO enlargement will proceed faster and, by the
time Poland and some other countries are admir
ted to the European Union, the requirement of
NATO membership as a qualification to join
WEU as a fullmember will be met.
In the hope that NATO enlargement can
start relatively soon, a number of counfties, includ-
ing Poland, have begun to adapt their armed
forces and governmental structures to the require-
ments of NATO and WEU. For example, in
Poland a new comprehensive law on the Ministry
of Defence came into force early in 1996, which
will bring the military under firm civilian confrol.
14. The expansion of NATO and, as a conse-
quence, the enlargement of WEU will solve one
of the key European problems outstanding at the
end of the 20th century. The area of stability will
be expanded and will undoubtedly project stability
even further. This prospect should not eliminate
attempts in other fields to promote a European
security system that will no longer be based on a
balance of power but on cooperation.
15. In practical terms, the first step is to deve-
lop cooperation within the framework of the Part-
nership for Peace. Poland was one of the first
countries to join the PfP and is still one of the
most active participants in this prograrnme.
It is worth considering to what extent WEU
could be involved in the prograrnme of military
exercises carried out within the PfP framework.
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16. Besides bilateral military cooperation
based on the agreements which Poland has signed
with all its neighbours (including Russia) and
most of the major WEU and NATO countries,
Poland considers regional cooperation as an
important factor of stability and mutual trust. In
particular, the Baltic region seems to have natural
potential as an area for enhanced confidence- and
security-building measures going beyond what
was already agreed in Vienna in 1990.
Conclasians
17. One of the key problems at the end of the
20th century is how to bring Central and Eastern
European countries into a Euro-Atlantic security
system, taking into account the sensitivities and
security interests of these countries, some of
which are not 
- 
at least at present 
- 
aspiring to
membership of the European Union, NATO and
WEU or which, for various reasons, cannot count
on joining these institutions in the near future.
In particular, this concerns Russia and, to a
lesser degree, Ukraine.
18. The process of NAIO enlargement is under
way. WEU should determine its own policy on
this process, because it will, to a large extent,
determine the enlargement of WEU.
It seems natural that WEU should welcome
the expansion of NATO as well as the expansion
of the European Union.
As a result, there will be a group of new
members within the European Union who would
be in NAIO as well and who would then meet all
the criteria for full membership of WEU. There-
fore, it would be natural to begin a study on WEU
enlargement. The intergovernmental conference
which is to begin soon should stimulate such a
debate within WEU.
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APPENDX M
Organising securily in Europe 
- 
defence aspects
Contribution from Mr Bjdrclg Sw eden (Observ er)
I.Introductian
1. The rapid changes in Europe have affected
the traditional security policy of Sweden. The
core of that policy, non-participation in military
alliances, remains unchanged. The present situa-
tion in the wake of the cold war, with Swedish
membership of the European Union and increas-
ingly rapid globalisation, has not led to funda-
mental changes, e.g. in our position towards the
United Nations or the defence of our territory. But
it brings new possibilities for contributing to the
strengthening of peace and security in Europe.
2. Sweden has been a member of the Euro-
pean Union since January 1995. European Union
membership and participation in the common
foreign and security policy improves Sweden's
security policy position and provides greater
opportunities to play an active part in security
policy issues in our neighbourhood as well as in
Europe at large.
3. It is Sweden's aim to have good cooper-
ation with all security organisations in Europe.
We have a special interest in furthering peace-pro-
moting activities of the organisations in question.
The end of the cold war has resulted in more active
Swedish participation in conflict prevention,
crisis management and peace building. This is a
sign of our commitrnent to laying solid founda-
tions for European stability and peace. A recent
example is extensive Swedish participation in
IFOR, the peace implementation force in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, under NATO command.
4. A higher level of ambition to participate in
peace-promoting activities is consistent with a
long Swedish tradition of promoting peace and
confibuting to international security, also at mili-
tary level, through peacekeeping operations under
United Nations or OSCE auspices. Over 60 000
Swedes have since 1948 served in United Nations
peacekeeping missions. The largest contribution
has been to missions on Cyprus, in Lebanon and
recently in Bosnia. We have a special training ins-
titute in Sweden for the preparation of peacekeep-
ing forces with participants from many different
countries. Experience has shown that special
training is crucial for the difEcult task of peace-
keeping.
5. Sweden has been an observer in Western
European Union for just over a year. Its current
observer status is compatible with Swedish policy
of non-participation in military alliances and pro-
vides us with the opportunity to participate in the
discussions in this forum of issues of interest to
us. We follow with interest the development of
WEU activities that conform to the Petersberg
Declaration.
6. Sweden's experience of the cooperation
which has taken place so far within the framework
of the Partnership for Peace is entirely positive.
7. The Organisation for Security and Coope-
ration in Europe (OSCE) is making a contribution
as a forum for a European security dialogue and
as a factor in building up a pan-European order
which can accorlmodate the security interests of
all European states. The organisation's principal
task today is conflict management, chiefly of a
preventive nature. Under the framework agree-
ment for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the OSCE
has been given a key role in building peace,
democracy and stability in that region.
II. Security policy objectives
8. The ultimate goal of Swedish security policy
is to secure the freedom and independence of our
country. To a large extent, Sweden's policy in the
foreign and defence policy sphere is guided by
our securify objectives. This is reflected in the fact
that our security policy has both a national and an
international dimension.
9. Traditionally, it tends to be said that states
have two kinds of security objectives: to survive
and to protect their autonomy. In other words,
states want to retain their internal and external
freedom of action, even when subject to external
threats, thus enabling their citizens to live a digru-
fied and decent life. The object of security policy
is to establish the prerequisites for such a state of
affairs.
10. This means that, at national level, we must
be able to address military threats which directly
affect Sweden. The most serious type of threat
would be military attack aimed at our freedom
and independence. We must also anticipate and be
able to deal with situations which might involve
serious tension or risks, even if they did not
actually represent a threat to Sweden's freedom
and independence.
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11. At international level, we must actively
participate in peace-promoting and humanitarian
measures, in cooperation with other states.In this
endeavour to achieve common securiry we will
be pursuing our long tradition of working for
peace and disarmament, particularly within the
framework of the United Nations, and for demo-
cratic, social, economic and ecologically sustain-
able development. We must also cooperate at
international level to anticipate and deal with non-
military threats and tension.
12. In the case of Europe, ouroverriding security
policy objective is to achieve lasting safeguards
for close cooperation between all states in a spirit
of confidence. In this connection, developments
in Cenfral and Eastern Europe tending towards a
deeper democratic culture, economic and social
progress, a better environment and greater open-
ness to the rest of the world is also a fundamental
Swedish interest. The foundations of Swedish
security must increasingly lie in common security,
based on durable political and economic relation-
ships between democratic states.
III. Non-pafiicipotion in military alliances
13. Sweden's policy of non-participation in
military allianss5 gives us the possibility to decide
on our position in the event of war in our vicinity.
It is also the national security policy framework
which offers the best possibility of meeting Swed-
ish security policy interests in a changed Europe.
This policy requires the maintenance of an ade-
quate and secure defence capability. By maintain-
ing a credible basis for the long-terrr strength of
our total defence, we are making our contribution
to stability in northern Europe.
14. If the security situation deteriorates, our
security policy should help to limit tension in our
neighbourhood. Apart from being able to defend
our territory against armed aggression and attack,
we must also be able to take action at foreign policy
level to protect Swedish interests in case of attack
or threats of attack in situations in which normal
relations between states may have broken down or
are not functioning properly.
15. The policy of non-participation in military
alliances has roots which go back to the situation
that prevailed in 19th century Europe. The tradi-
tional description of Swedish security policy as
non-participation in alliances in time of peace,
aiming at neutrality in time of war, which is often
summarised in the public debate as the policy of
neufiality, was established in a climate character-
ised by the cold war. Even a country which chose
to pursue an independent security policy outside
the major blocs could not ignore this climate 
- 
it
had to bear a special burden and responsibility for
making its chosen policy credible. As a result,
Sweden refrained from any form of cooperation
and commitments which might have involved our
country in the foreign policy and security
conflicts of the great powers and which in turn
might have led to doubts about our intentions and
our ability to implement our declared policy.
16. An important objective in Swedish foreign
policy was to avoid causing uncertainty in the form
of fears or expectations on the part of any major
power that Sweden might allow itself to be used to
the advantage of one side or the other in a critical
situation. In view of this objective, our commit-
ments to European cooperation came to be charact-
erised by self-imposed restrictions and resfraint.
17. In this respect too, the situation which pre-
vailed in our part of the world has now changed
fundamentally. The relationships which are being
built up in the new Europe are characterised by
extensive and growing cooperation in a network
of partiaily overlapping and cooperating bodies
and structures, within which cooperation also
includes security policy. This is a question of
qualitatively new forms of cooperation for Euro-
pean security in which all European countries
have a part to play.
18. This means that the prerequisites for Swe-
dish security policy are not the same as they were
in the cold war epoch. Active participation in
European cooperation is now necessary if any
state is to be able to influence developments and
to contribute to the establishment of a new order
for peace and security on our continent. This
applies not least to small and medium-sized Euro-
pean countries.
19. The retention of a policy of non-participa-
tion in military alliances does not require that
Sweden would need to apply self-imposed restric-
tions in any other respects as regards participation
in the multi-faceted form of European coopera-
tion which is emerging. On the conftary, Swedish
security policy is characterised by active and full
participation in efforts to achieve the objectives
which are now shared by all European states. Our
ambition is to make effective contributions tojoint peace-promotion and humanitarian mea-
sures, both in Europe and elsewhere, and to esta-
blish an effective European crisis-management
capability which functions well and can contri-
bute to promoting stability and the peaceful settle-
ment of conflicts in the European area.
IV The Bahic Searegion
20. Development of common security and sta-
bility in the Baltic Sea region, our own neighbour-
hood, is of prime importance for Swedish security.
In order to promote the stability and prosperity of
the region, Sweden places great emphasis on
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regional cooperation among the Baltic Sea states.
As Chairman of the Council of Baltic Sea States,
the Swedish Government has invited the Heads of
Government of the CBSS and the President of the
European Commission to a summit conference in
May this year. The purpose of the conference is to
support democracy, encourage economic coope-
raiion and contacts and further develop environ-
mental measures. Sweden considers that the Euro-
pean Union has a particular responsibility to
support stability in the region and welcomes the
preparation by the Commission of a Baltic Sea
region initiative.
21. Sweden's bilateral cooperation plan to pro-
mote security in the Baltic states includes initia-
tives in the areas of coast guard services, border
control, police, customs and civil defence. The
setting-up and raining of a common Baltic peace-
keeping force, the Baltic battalion (BALIBAT) is
a jolnt initiative of the Nordic states with a num-
ber of other countries (Germany, the United King-
dom and the United States). Cooperation among
parliamentarians is a valuable stimulus to coope-
iation among the Baltic Sea states and helps to
develop democratic processes and parliamentary
culture. Annual parliamentary conferences are
being held under the auspices of the Nordic
Council to consider cooperation in the political
and security fields as well as on economic and
environmental questions.
22. The integration of the Baltic states into the
European Union is of major security policy inter-
est and will benefit not only their immediate
neighbours, but Europe as a whole.
V Organisations for European securily
23. It is the Swedish ambition to cooperate in
the promotion of peace and security with all the
organisations which form the pillars of the Euro-
pean security structure. In addition to our pq:!cip-
ation in the United Nations and the OSCE, we
participate in the corlmon foreign and security
policy of the European Union, are observers in
WEU and cooperate with NATO and the majority
of European states in the framework of the Part-
nership for Peace. We contribute to the work of
strengthening democracy in Europe through the
Council of Burope. The OSCE, the Council of the
Baltic Sea states and the Barents Euro-Arctic
Council have a special value from a Swedish
security policy point of view in that Russia is an
equal partner in cooperation.
24. The common foreign and security policy of
the European Union, including preventive action,
and WEU crisis-prevention, peacekeeping and
crisis-management capabilities should be seen as
complementary tools in a broad spectrum of ins-
truments to deal with the new security challenges.
The European Union's capaciry, both to prevent
conflicts and to handle them once they have
broken out, should be enhanced. Sweden's policy
of non-participation in military alliances does not
restrict us in areas other than aspects related
to Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty.
Consequently, the scope for joint action is wide.
We are prepared to participate, on a case-by-case
basis, in WEU Petersberg-type operations such as
humanitarian actions, peacekeeping operations
and crisis-management.
25. An important factor influencing European
stability and security is the enlargement of the
European Union to those countries in Central and
Eastern Europe aspiring to membership. It is
important that enlargement of the European
Union does not exclude Russia from intensified
cooperation with the Union.
VI. Conclasians
26. Over a long perid of time, Sweden followed
a policy of neurality. This is now history. In the
last few years, Sweden has become a member of
the European Union and the Partnership for Peace
and is an observer in Western European Union.
There are Swedish IFOR roops in Bosnia under
NATO command. All this should be seen as
evidence that Swedish foreign and security policy
is being analysed with the new situation in Europe
as the point of departure. It is a process which will
no doubt continue, with an openness on the
Swedish side to discuss new situations as they
arise, to analyse without censuring and to judge
every situation on its own merits.
27. Many of the security organisations that we
now have are designed for the cold war situation
which existed previously, not for today's Euro-
pean climate. Changes are thus necessary, and on
their way. We will follow the developments in
various fields with great interest. Sweden is pre-
pared to contribute to reforms which could lead to
improvements in the organisation of security in
Europe.
28. The main goal must be to be able to prevent
regional conflicts in Europe. But if such conflicts
do break out, they must be solved in a European
context. This underlines the need for the creation
of a European framework in which action could
be taken rapidly. The European Union is primarily
an economic institution.
29. The experience of the war in former Yugo-
slavia clearly indicates that Europe does not have
the military and civilian resources to act efficiently.
It is therefore necessary to create a European mili-
tary structue fql handling regional conflicts in our
part of the world. Against this background, it is my
opinion that WEU should be the European instru-
ment responsible for the tasks indicated above.
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